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FY 1976 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 36: *What are the internal stresses and alignments within the central leadership and at the key regional levels, and how are these likely to affect the main lines of China's foreign policy and its economic and military policies?*

Consider how these policies are likely to be changed by the successors to Mao and Chou.

I. COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION NEEDS

A. The principal areas on which reporting and analysis are required during the fiscal year are:

Target 1: Information on Chinese foreign policy directives relating to US and USSR. Information on the decision making process in formulating policy on the US and USSR.

Target 2: Information on "radical" elements in the Chinese leadership and their influence on internal and foreign policies.

Target 3: Description of leadership elements who would either oppose or favor improved relations with the US.

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Target 4: Identification and description of leadership elements and factions who might favor improved relations with the USSR.

Target 5: Background and objectives in key personnel shifts at central and regional leadership levels.


Target 6: Chinese military and political inter-relations -- degree and nature of control of party over army, areas of conflict, individuals involved, military influence in foreign policy.

Target 7: Identify the main contenders for future leadership and clarify their strengths and policies. How do they line up and what issues and feuds divide them.

Target 8: Information on issues, personalities and factions involved in provincial and local disorders and the impact on the central leadership.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENTS

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


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B. Production

The following types of intelligence analysis and

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production will be required to fulfill this KIQ
during the fiscal year:

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Target 1: This will be covered in analysis done by

[REDACTED] in the course of regular
production.

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25X9A1

Target 2: This will be covered in analysis done by
State INR and CIA/DDI in the course of regular produc-
tion.

Target 3: This will be covered by analysis done by
State INR and CIA/DDI in the course of regular pro-
duction.

Target 4: A community effort is underway to try to
identify elements in the Chinese leadership who might
favor an improvement of relations with the USSR. This
involves State, CIA/DDI, CIA/DDO and DIA.

CIA/DDI/OPR is scheduled to produce two papers on this
subject: one is The USSR and China's Leaders and the
other analyzes problems between the two countries and
the degree to which these might be resolved.

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Target 5: DIA will analyze military shifts and rehabilitations in its study on Central Directive 18 (See Target 5 KIQ 35, Production). State INR and CIA/DDI are prepared to do analytical pieces on provincial shifts if subsequent developments warrant their re-search efforts.

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Target 6: CIA/DDI/OPR will produce a work on Chinese security forces and their relation to political power in the Peking Military Region and Peking Garrison. DIA/DIR will complete a study on PLA and political unrest in East China and its implication for political military relations in the PRC.

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25X1D0a

CIA/DDI/OPR is doing an analysis of the central military leadership after the fall of Lin Piao, its reconstruction and its character. OPR is also doing a study on the General Political Department of the PLA.

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Target 7: CIA/DDI/OCI has completed a piece on the succession in China and the community is prepared to write a SNIE on succession in the event of a major change such as the death of Mao or Chou. CIA/DDI/OPR is doing an in-depth study of the post Mao leadership.

CIA/DDI/OPR is also doing a study of the probable domestic policies of the post Mao succession leaders.

25X1D0a



Target 8: CIA/DDI/OPR has completed a study of China's labor reform centers. In addition, CIA/DDI/OPR will undertake an analysis of issues, personalities and factions at the provincial level and how they impact on central leadership.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

None.

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